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CHAPTER 20 
Workmen's Compensation 
LAURENCE S. LOCKE 
§20.1. Introduction. During the 1970 SURVEY year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court decided only eight cases involving the Workmen's 
Compensation Act.1 Rescript opinions were written in three of the 
cases. The decisions involved no questions of first impression but pro-
vide useful examples of the corrective function of judicial review in 
preserving the rights of the parties and limiting the role of the Indus-
trial Accident Board and the Superior Court. 
A. CouRT DEcisiONs 
§20.2. Administrative due process: Evidentiary basis of decision 
of Industrial Accident Board. The parties subject to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act are entitled to a hearing on any issue affecting 
them.l Although the Industrial Accident Board is a "quasi-judicial" 
or "administrative" tribunal2 whose proceedings "ought not to be 
hampered by technicalities,''3 hearings before the board are conducted 
in generally the same way and with the same safeguards as hearings 
before a master or auditor, or a judge sitting without a jury. Mem-
bers of the board in presiding over hearings are guided and controlled 
by the same general principles which govern judicial officers in dis-
charging similar functions. Rules as to the conduct of hearings, the 
admission or exclusion of evidence, burden of proof and measure of 
persuasion, as developed at common law and modified by statute, 
apply in cases before the board:4 
Hearings must be conducted with due regard for the constitutional 
LAURENCE S. LocKE is a partner in the Boston law firm of Horovitz, Petkun and 
Locke, and author of the Massachusetts Practice Series volume on Workmen's 
Compensation (1968). 
§20.1. 1 G.L., c. 152. 
§20.2. 1 Joos' Case, 267 Mass. 322, 166 N.E. 723 (1929). 
2 Monico's Case, 350 Mass. 183, 213 N.E.2d 865 (1966) (quasi-judicial tribunal); 
Levangie's Case, 228 Mass. 213, 117 N.E. 200 (1917); Devine's Case, 236 Mass. 588, 
129 N.E. 414 (1921); Broderick's Case, 320 Mass. 149, 150, 67 N.E.2d 897, 898 (1946) 
("an administrative board not part of the judicial system of the Commonwealth"). 
3 Carroll's Case, 225 Mass. 203, 208, 114 N.E. 285, 287 (1916); Walsh's Case, 227 
Mass. 34, 116 N.E. 496, 6 A.L.R. 567 (1917); Belezarian's Case, 307 Mass. 597, 3l 
N.E.2d 4 (1940) (members often laymen). . 
4 Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51, 102 N.E. 932 (1913). 
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requisites of due process of law. Previous cases have upheld the right 
to be represented by counsel of one's choice,5 to present evidence and 
have it considered in the determination of the case,6 and to offer argu-
ment on the pertinent issues.7 To this list, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in Haley's Case,s has now added the requirement that no fact 
be considered and referred to by the single member or reviewing 
board that is not properly admitted and made a part of t.he evidence at 
the hearing. 
A decision of the single member, affirmed and adopted by the review-
ing board, allowing partial incapacity compensation only to February 
28, 1964, was reversed as tainted with legal error where it appeared that 
this was the date of a medical examination by a physician who was not 
called to testify and whose report was never made a part of the evi-
dence. His report was in the possession of the plant nurse when she 
testified before the single member. Employee's counsel. attempted to 
incorporate a statement from the report in a question to the nurse, but 
an objection was sustained. Neither the report, nor any portion of it, 
was introduced into the evidence. Despite that exclusion, the decision 
of the single member contained a lengthy reference to, and quotation 
from, the examination and report of the physician. It was apparent 
that his opinion was accepted, because the date on which partial 
compensation terminated was the date of the examination by this 
physician. Both the single member and the reviewing board went 
beyond the evidence before them in arriving at their decision. As a 
result, the decree of the Superior Court incorporating the board's 
decision was reversed as based on an error of law by the board. In the 
words of the Court, 
Parties to proceedings before a single member or a reviewing 
board under G.L. c. 152, §§ 8 and 10, are entitled to a hearing ... 
[and] are then entitled to a decision based on the evidence pre-
sented at the hearing. Nothing can be considered or treated as 
evidence which is not introduced as such. Although the board is 
an administrative body, and not a court, its decisions partake of 
the nature of a court's decisions .... Constitutional due process 
requirements apply to board hearings and decisions.9 
The Court cited many cases in other jurisdictions in support of the 
5 Ackroyd's Case, 340 Mass. 214, 163 N.E.2d 271 (1960) (refusal of opportunity to 
have trial counsel with knowledge of the case may, in some circumstances, be an 
abuse of discretion, bordering on abuse of due process). 
6 Meunier's Case, 319 Mass. 421, 66 N.E.2d 198 (1946) (provision giving conclusive 
force to report of medical panel in occupational disease cases held unconstitutional 
deprivation of fundamental rights of parties). 
7 Khachadoorian's Case, 329 Mass. 625, llO N.E.2d ll5 (1953); Benham's Case, 
356 Mass. 196, 248 N.E.2d 507 (1969) (actual argument not necessary if opportunity 
for oral argument is offered at some stage of proceedings before final decision). 
s 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 133, 255 N.E.2d 322. 
9 Id. at 136, 255 N.E.2d at 825. 
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rule that the decision on a workmen's compensation claim may not be 
based upon facts not introduced in evidence at the hearing. The 
same rule has been applied to a number of administrative boards in 
Massachusetts. The Court then held that the board's action in consid-
ering and treating the medical report as· part of the evidence violated 
the employee's right to administrative due process . 
. . . For this reason, we hold the decision of the board should be 
set aside, even though there was other evidence which, if believed, 
was sufficient to support the decision.lo 
The Court felt so strongly about the violation of the employee's 
rights that it ordered a trial de novo before the board. It might have 
remanded the case for a decision anew on the evidence already intro-
duced, with the admonition to ignore the medical report; but, obvi-
ously, this would involve the risk that the board might merely rely 
upon the other evidence which warranted the same conclusion. Only 
a completely fresh hearing before another member would adequately 
protect the employee from the taint of the board's error. 
Not all workmen's compensation boards decide controversies in the 
manner. of a court. Some permit decision on the basis of letters, 
interviews, hospital and medical reports, and even memoranda by staff 
medical and legal advisers. Such procedures are intended to provide 
speedy adjudication with a minimum of bother to physicians and a 
minimum of involvement by lawyers. They further the slow erosion 
of legal guarantees and the steady drift toward bureaucratic absolut-
ism. Fortunately, the majority of jurisdictions insist on the minimum 
guarantees of administrative due process spelled out in Haley's Case. 
Significant rights of the parties are involved and, in the long term, 
the rights of the injured will be best protected- as the instant case 
shows. 
The case, however, should not be construed by the members of the 
Industrial Accident Board as depriving them of any powers vested in 
them under the act, provided they are consistent with administrative 
due process. The Workmen's Compensation Act gives the single 
member the power to "make such inquires and investigations as shall 
be deemed necessary."11 The problem of backlog plaguing injured 
employees, insurers and the board alike requires a creative use of the 
board's powers in an efforts to secure fair disposition of controversies 
without formal hearings and to expedite the hearings and the filing of 
decisions. As the board strives to make important progress in this 
direction, the reminder of the Court to temper its actions in the spirit 
of due process is especially timely. 
10 Id. at 137, 255 N.E.2d at 326. 
11 G.L., ·c. 152, §8. These powers are set forth in detail by the author in 29 Mass. 
P1·actice Series §491 (1968). 
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§20.3. Assaults: Incapacity: Power of the Superior Court to modify 
the decision of the single member. While proceeding on an errand 
connected with his work, an employee was struck on the back of the 
head with a piece of pipe wielded by a fellow employee. The board 
found that he was hit "for no reason whatsoever; that he ... did or 
said nothing to provoke this." Even though there was ·~vidence that 
there was bad blood between them (connected with racial antago-
nism), there had been no 'fight and the victim had done nothing to 
provoke the fellow employee into striking him. The board found 
that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment and 
awarded compensation for several periods of claimed incacpacity. The 
Superior Court found no evidence of compensable disability beyond a 
certain date and entered a decree awarding compensati:on with this 
modification. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decree.l 
The Court had no difficulty with the case. It rested its decision on 
the broadest of general grounds, restating its rule from Caswell's Case: 
"An injury arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, 
conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other 
words, out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects."2 The 
Court referred to its decision in Baran's Case3 for a full discussion of 
the reasons underlying its opinion in the case before it. The Court 
there had upheld an award of compensation to an employee who, 
while leaving his employer's mill at the close of the day's work, was 
unintentionally shot by a youth alone in his room in a nearby 
house and engaged in aiming practice. It then concluded with a pass-
ing reference to Dillon's Case4 and to an influential article in this area 
by Samuel B. Horovitz.5 
The easy acceptance of this award is in sharp contrast with the 
difficulty encountered by victims of assault in the early days of the act. 
In the first cases, assaults were considered as related to employment 
only where they might be reasonably anticipated because of the gen-
eral character of the work or the peculiar duties of the workman.6 
However, the range of this rule was narrow, and most cases fell outside 
its scope. Compensation was not awarded for a night watchman 
§20.3. 1 Parker's Case, 1970 Ma~s. Adv .. Sh. ®5, 258 N.E.2d 308. 
2 Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2.d 328, 330 (1940) (hurricane caused 
factory wall to crumble upon employee). 
3 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957). 
4 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949). 
5 Horovitz, Assaults .and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation .Laws, 41 
U. Ill. L.R. 311, 339-341 (1946). . . 
6 McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (19U!) (fellow employee of known 
vicious disposition when drunk); Reithel's Case, 22 Mass. 163, 109 N.E. 951 (1915) 
(ejecting trespasser); Broadbent's Case, 240 Mass. 449, 134 N.E. 632 (1922) (quelling 
disturbance); Cranney's Case, 232 Mass. 149, 122 N,~.: 266 {1919), Zygmuntowicz v. 
American Steel- & Wire Co., 240 Mass. 42;1,, lM, N.E. 385 (192~) ·(assaults, by dis-
gruntled employees). 
4
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accidentally shot, 7 nor for an employee waiting in line when he was 
knocked down by other employees engaged in a friendly scufHe,s nor 
for a peacemaker struck down while trying to stop a fight over tools.9 
The General Court· came to t)J.e rescue of the innocent victim· in 
1937. It provided a conclusive· presumption of compensability for an 
employee "injured by reason of the physical activities of fellow em-
ployees in which he does not participate, whether or not such activ-
ities are associated with the employment."lO The Court in the instant 
case could have relied upon this· amendment, as the claimant was the 
victim of a blow from a fellow . employee and ·had not prqvoked or 
participated in the event. However, as indicated, the Court chose to 
rely upon the broader ground. 
The evolution of a. general theory of co10pensability of assaults in 
Massachusetts followed the broadened concept of. compensability laid 
down by the Court in Caswell's Case, mentioned abOve: The ''actual 
risk'' test gradually replaced the tes't of foreseeability. In 1948 the 
Court upheld an award made, without proof of motive, to a .taxi 
driver who was assaulted late at night by a passenger: "The question 
is whether his employment brought him in ·contact with the .tisk that 
in fact caused his injuries."11 The taxi driver· was a nonparticipant 
who could have recovered under the 1937 amendment, but the Court 
preferred to use the occasion to expand the. concept of compensability 
of assaults. · 
The protection of the act was extended to participants, even if they 
were initiators of an affray, in the landmark decision in Dillon's 
Case.12 A gang leader in charge of eight longshoremen was blinded 
by a blow struck by a fellow workman in the course of a fight, as he 
tried to enfor(;e discipline. On evidence that Dillon had struck the 
first blow, the board dismissed the claim. On appeal, the Court 
remanded the case. Even if the victim strikes the first blow, that fact 
does not bar recovery ·~if it can be seen that the whole affair had its 
origin in the. nature and conditions of employment."13 On recom~ 
mittal, the board made an award.· Later, in a case where two em-
ployees quarreled over the use of a new tool, the board again allowed 
:recovery. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, saying that it would 
support such awards "when supported by reasonable evidence of 
. 7 Harbroe's <;ase, 22!1 Mass.l!l9, ll1 N.E. 709 (1916) (reversed by Baran's Case, !136 
Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (19~7)). 
IJ Lee's Case, 240 Mass. 47!1,1!14 N.E. 268 (1922); Moore's Case, 225 Mass. 258, 114 
N.E; 204 0916) .... · • . . 
. . 9 GavroS' -Case, 240 Mass. !139, 1!14 N.E. 269 (1922). 
10 St. 1937, c. !170, §1, amending G.L., c. J52, §26. The test is nonparticipaticin, and 
previous participation is no bar if ~t ~~~de~ .. before the injury. S_ee Zarba v. Lane, 
!122 Mass. 1!12, 76 N.E.2d 818 (1947). • •· · 
11 McLean's Case, 32!1 Mass. !15, !18, 80 N.E.2d 40, 4!1 (1948). 
12 !124 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949).• · · · · 
1Bid.atl07,85N·.E~it:.?2.:,'; .-·.' .. J •• 
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injuries from fights occurring during ordinary routine of employment 
and in connection with incidents of that employment."14 · 
Finally, in 1969, the Court upheld an award under even more 
extended circumstances. Two co-workers had a protracted dispute 
over the use of work equipment. The claimant, an older and smaller 
man, became enraged, grabbed a pipe and attacked the other from 
behind, striking him on the back of the head. In the scuffle that 
followed, claimant was knocked to the floor and the other man rup~ 
tured the globe of his eye. The Court upheld an award, saying that, 
although the injury did not, strictly speaking, result from a work-
quarrel, it occured ''in the line of consequences resulting from the 
circumstances and conditions of the employment ... _." 15 . 
And, most recently, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Parker's Case,16 
has placed assaults on the same footing as all other claims for injuries 
arising out of and in the course of employment. No special rule must 
be relied upon, limited to so-called assault cases. It is now enough; as it 
should always have been, to show that the employee was injured while 
he. was "upon his employer's premises occupying himself consistently 
with his contract of hire in some manner pertaining to or incidental 
to his employment."17 The Court has now applied to assault cases 
not just the "actual risk" test laid down in Caswell but the broader 
"position-risk" test enunciated in Baran. Where the risk is neutral, 
that is, not clearly employment-related nor clearly personal to the 
employee, the application of such a test would appear to generate just 
results. 
A subsidiary feature of the case pertains to the power of the Supe-
rior Court to modify an award of partial incapacity compensation. 
When the case was before the Superior Court, the judge had ruled that 
there was no evidence in the record to sustain an award for a certain 
period and had entered a decree omitting this period. The Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed this aspect of the decree. On a review of the 
record, it found that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the 
finding that the employee was partially incapacitated for this period. 
Although, admittedly, the board has full power to find the facts on 
conflicting evidence and to draw all reasonable inferences from. the 
evidence- and on appeal, the board's action will be final~ its 
finding must be based upon some evidence, however· slight. Where 
there is no evidence, nor any basis whatsoever for an inference, the 
Superior Court or the Supreme Judicial Court may set( aside the 
finding, and either dismiss the claim to that extent or remand. tl;re case 
for further evidence and decision de n·ovo. This power is an essential 
aspect of judicial review, and its continuing exercise is requisite Jo.the 
constitutional due process to which the_parties are. entitled. 
14 Blanchard's Case, 335 Mass. 175, 177, 138 N.E.2d 762, 763 (1956).~ . · 
15 Tripp's Case, 355 .Mass; 515., 517~518, 246. N.E.2d 449, 451 (1959). 
16 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 258 N.E.2d 308.; , ~ >.r 
17 Id. at 606, 258 N.E. at 309, citing Baran's Case, note .7. ~upra. 
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. §20.4. Specific compensation: Award to survivor. In Section 16.7 
of the 1968 ANNUAL SuRvEY, this author discussed the rights of survi-
vors to share in an award of specific compensation, a payment for 
permanent injuries over and above all other benefits, as set forth in a 
schedule in G.L., c. 152, § 36. The right of survivorship is provided 
by Section 36A, as construed in Henderson's Case,1 Lauble's Case,2 and 
two cases discussed in Section 16.7 of the 1968 SuRVEY- Bosanquet's 
Gase3 and Morris's Case.4 It was stated then that these cases make it 
clear that there is no requirement of a minimum period of time 
during which the employee must live following his injury in order for 
the survivor to become entitled to collect the payment that would have 
been due the injured employee. Any lingering doubts would not be 
put to rest by the rescript opinion of the court in Chin's Case.5 A 26-
year-old man fell from the twenty-first to the tenth floor of the Pru-
dential building, then under construction, and suffered multiple in-
juries from which he died several hours later. The claimant widow 
was awarded specific compensation for total loss of function of both 
arms and both legs, disfigurement, and for losses of other bodily 
functions. On appeal, the Court found that the award was based 
upon evidence which, though contradicted, supported the decision of 
the board. No point was made as to whether the injured man had 
ever recovered consciousness and no differentiation was made between 
those losses which were the direct cause of death and those losses 
which were separable from the fatal injury. 
Enough cases have now been decided on the interpretation of Sec-
tion 36A so that it can be said with confidence that the Supreme Judi-
cial Court is not going to narrow the scope of the section by judicial 
construction. So long as there is medical evidence from which the 
board is able to determine with reasonable medical certainty the exact 
losses of bodily function the employee would have been left with had 
he survived, the board's determination will be affirmed.6 
§20.5. Findings and decision of Industrial Accident Board: Powers 
of Superior Court to affirm, modify or reverse. Cases in which the 
court reviews decisions of the Industrial Accident Board to determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a finding may be of 
little interest in the development of the law or construction of the act, 
but they are of intense interest to those responsible for the daily ad-
ministration of workmen's compensation. In such cases the outer 
limits of the act are tested, and the resultant decisions influence 
§2o.4. 1333 Mass. 491, 131 N.E.2d 925 (1956). 
2 341 Mass. 520, 170 N.E.2d 720 (1960). 
3 353 Mass. 364, 231 N.E.2d 567 (1967). 
4 354 Mass. 420, 238 N.E.2d 35 (1968). 
5 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 835, 258 N.E.2d 925. 
6 See also Machado's Case,- Mass.-, 249 N.E.2d 743 (1969) and Taylor's Case, 
355 Mass. 797, 247 N.E.2d 395 (1969). 
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practical decision-making by insurance companies, cla.ims attorneys 
and individual board members. 
In Larrabee's Case,t the board awarded benefits to a widow, finding 
that the employee's death resulted from "acute liver failure caused by 
extensive damage to his liver organ." He had inhaled fumes con-
taining clorothene, and the board found that he was especially sus-
ceptible to harmful effects from such inhalation because of certain 
medication he was taking for an unrelated medical condition. There 
was medical testimony of a direct causal relationship between the 
inhalation of these fumes and the destructive process which a medical 
expert found upon autopsy of the employee's liver. The Supreme 
Judical Court found the testimony of the pathologist competent 
although he was not a toxicologist. 
In Wax's Case,2 total disability compensation was awarded to a 
newspaper mailer. for aggravation of obstructive emphysema and 
fibrosis as the result of exposure to a dusty environment containing 
paper particles and printer's ink. After reviewing the testimony that 
the employee's emphysema had been aggravated by his work atmo-
sphere, the Court upheld the decision of the reviewing board. The 
fact that one doctor on cross-examination had, at one point, admitted 
that the link was a "possibility" did not detain the Court, nor did 
alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the other physician: "It 
was for the board to evaluate this testimony and weigh its infirmities 
in the context of all the evidence before it concerning the place of 
employment and the conditions obtaining there."3 
In Rennie's Case,4 the Court reviewed an award of death benefits for 
a fatal heart attack to determine whether the inferences drawn by the 
board were proper and whether errors in a hypothetical question were 
so material as to require the board to have excluded the answer. The 
deceased was a gas company serviceman. On the day before his death, 
he worked his regular shift from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. and worked again 
that evening, returning about 10 P.M. While sitting: at home, he 
stated that he had never felt as tired in his life. After retiring that 
night, he suffered severe chest pain. However, the next morning he 
arose at his regular hour and went to work, saying he felt fine. He 
was ordered to install a five-light meter at a home in Newtonville. 
He was found dead in the seat of the employer's truck about 10:50 
A.M. at the Newtonville address. His death was due to acute 
myocardial infarction. A company official visited the house later that 
morning and found a meter weighing ten pounds partially installed on 
the wall about five feet from the floor. Such meters were carried in 
the service trucks for installation. 
§20.5. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 836, 258 N.E.2d 927. 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 903, 259 N.E.2d 561. 
3 Id. at 905, 259 N.E.2d at 563. 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 955, 260 N.E.2d 186. 
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The insurer contended that the board decision contained unsup-
ported findings. The Court noted that these findings, even if unsup-
portable, were not germane to the issue of whether the employee's 
job-related activity caused his death. On that issue, the evidence sup-
ported the conclusion that he lifted the meter and carried it from the 
truck to the house and then partially installed it. This conclusion, in 
tum, supported a finding that such activity caused the heart disorder 
which precipitated death. 
The insurer also contended that the physician's opinion upon which 
the board relied should have been ignored, because the hypothetical 
statement contained factual assumptions unsupported by the evidence. 
Again, the Court took the view that these misstatements were immate-
rial, that even if they had been omitted or corrected, the doctor's 
opinion as to the effect of lifting and partially installing the meter 
would have remained the same. There was no error in admitting the 
hypothetical question, even if the assumptions went beyond the evi-
dence in insignificant details. 
An additional contention of the insurer was that the doctor's opin-
ion was based upon a mere statistical probability. The Court noted 
that the response in question- "it is on statistical probabilities" -
came in answer to a narrow hypothetical question referring only to 
information appearing on the death certificate. Examination of the 
employee's symptoms between 10 P.M. and 2:30A.M., coupled with his 
physical activity thereafter to the time of his death, formed the princi-
pal basis of the doctor's opinion. Upon these facts, such opinion was 
not limited to a mere statistical likelihood.!' 
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
§20.6. Benefit increases: Payments to widows and widowers. Sec-
tion 31 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides for benefits 
payable to widows or widowers, and children of the employee, in the 
event of death resulting from a compensable injury. The amount 
payable to widows or widowers had been $40 per week since August 
27, 1964. This amount has now been raised to $45.1 No other bene-
fit provided by the section has been increased. Payments for children 
remain at $6 per child to the age of 18, so a widow and three chil-
dren will now receive $63 per week. The change is effective for in-
juries occurring after November 23, 1970. 
§20.7. Subsequent injuries. The date of injury has always con-
trolled the rate of benefits payable for disability, even if the period be 
years or months later, when the cost of living may be much higher, 
and when the benefit scale for contemporary injuries may have been 
raised by an intervening act of the legislature.1 This has been the cause 
5 Cf. King's Case, 352 Mass. 488, 491, 225 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1967). 
§20.6. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 860, amending G.L., c. 152, §31. 
~20.7. 1 Locke, Workmen's·Compensation, 29 Mass. Practice Series §177 (1968). 
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of much hardship to workmen with protracted disability, as the declin-
ing value of their weekly compensation benefit has forced them into 
miserable poverty and required them to resort to charity or welfare. 
Particularly galling is the plight of workmen who return to work and 
suffer a later period of incapacity, after the legislature has increased 
the benefit scale. For such a workman, there is the additional prob-
lem of a potential controversy as to whether he has received a new 
injury which aggravates the old condition or merely has, a recurrence 
of the old injury. Such controversies often seriously deby payment of 
compensation. 
In an effort to alleviate this hardship, the legislature enacted Chap-
ter 667 of the Acts of 1970, inserting a new section 35B: 
An employee who has been receiving compensation under this 
chapter and who has returned to work for a period of not less 
than two months shall, if he is subsequently injured and receives 
compensation, be paid such compensation at the rate in effect at 
the time of the subsequent injury whether or not such subsequent 
injury is determined to be a recurrence of the fonner injury; 
provided, that if compensation for the old injury was paid in a 
lump sum, he shall not receive compensation unless the subse-
quent claim is determined to be a new injury.2 
The section is to take effect on February 1, 1971. 
Unfortunately, the statute is inartistically drafted and may be con-
strued so as to effect no change from the present law. If a workman 
sustains a subsequent injury, he will not need the benefit of the amend-
ment to receive payment at the current rate.3 But the legislature 
clearly intended that· amendment cover cases of subsequent disability, 
whether the cause of the disability be a recurrence of the old injury 
or a new incident which would qualify as a subsequent injury under 
the existing case law. It would be highly desirable if the act were 
redrafted before its effective date, to clarify its terms and eliminate the 
risk that the courts may frustrate the intent of the legislature. 
If the act is to be redrafted, it would be desirable also to include 
the larger group of injury victims whose compensation benefits are 
limited to the rate in effect on the date of injury but who have never 
been able to return to work. Such victims are obviously in even 
greater need of help. It would be a simple matter to provide that 
injured workers be paid compensation according to the rate in effect 
at the time of disability, regardless of the date of their injury. To 
eliminate constitutional difficulties, the act could be made to apply 
prospectively to injuries occurring after its effective date. This might 
not aid those currently disabled, but it would rectify the problem for 
all injured hereafter. A start must be made. 
2 G.L., c. 152, §35B. 
3 Locke, Workmen's Compensation, 29 ·Mass. Practice Series §178 (1968). 
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